

ADCI

MEETING WITH SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

12 November 1982

Please return to:  
SA/DCI/IA

**Page Denied**

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied

SECRET

## MEETING WITH SECRETARY WEINBERGER

Admin Prod

Admin

Agenda

Casey.

25X1  
25X1

- |                                       |                   |
|---------------------------------------|-------------------|
| 1. Weinberger Trip to Far East        | Tab A             |
| 2. Pakistan                           |                   |
| -- Redeye Missiles                    | Tab B             |
| -- F-16 Radars                        | Tab C             |
| -- Estimate                           | Tab D             |
| -- Israel/India                       | Tab E             |
| 3. SATCOM Support                     | Tab F             |
| 4. NFIC-FY 84 Budget Follow-up        | Tab G             |
| 5. MX Recommendation to the President |                   |
| -- OSWR Analysis                      | Tab H             |
| -- Townes Panel Report                | (Separate Folder) |
| 6. Cuba Policy Review                 |                   |
| -- Clark Memos                        | Tab I             |
| -- DO Input                           | Tab J             |
| -- NIO/LA Input                       | Tab K             |

Other Items of Possible Interest

- |                          |       |
|--------------------------|-------|
| 7. Iran-Soviet Relations | Tab L |
| 8. Afghanistan           | Tab M |

25X1

SECRET

**SECRET**

12 November 1982

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Acting DCI Meeting with Weinberger and Carlucci,  
12 November 1982

The following subjects were discussed:

- Soviet Succession. There was a brief discussion of Andropov's selection as Party Chief and the fact that he has never been to the West. Prospects for his leadership and policies were discussed. The ADCI commented he is likely to be a tough person to deal with.
- DCI Trip. [REDACTED] 25X1  
[REDACTED] 25X1
- Weinberger Trip. He briefed at some length his recent trip to ASEAN countries, New Zealand and Australia. He mentioned that all of them want warm relations with the US except the Laborites in New Zealand. He commented that the current government in Australia is being threatened by the labor party. He mentioned his offer to Hayden for a briefing on the Soviet threat. The ADCI mentioned that he will work this out with the Ambassador and Director of DIA. [REDACTED] 25X1  
[REDACTED] 25X1  
New Zealand and Australia both have agreed and are anxious for US Navy port calls including ships with nuclear weapons. Neither New Zealand or Australia will contribute forces to the MNF in Lebanon for budgetary reasons. In addition, New Zealand is going to recall its contingent in Singapore. His trip to Indonesia was a success, finding Suharto to be very helpful and making a pitch for F-16s. Weinberger didn't think that Defense would agree to that request. SecDef raved about Singapore, whose economy is booming, and commented that Lee Kuan Yew wants closer ties with US. The Thais, meanwhile, are concerned about a Vietnamese invasion through Kampuchea and want more of everything.
- Pakistan. Regarding the Redeye issue, Carlucci confirmed that Defense will go ahead with the 100 missiles, and the Army is assessing the possibility of the sale of 300 more. Regarding the ALR-69 radars, Carlucci is reserved because of the possibility of them being passed to Chinese. The Air Force is against and Weinberger is neutral. The ADCI then briefed on Pakistan's nuclear program [REDACTED] 25X1

**SECRET**

CL BY Signer  
DECL OADR

25X1

(  
SECRET

- SATCOM Support. The ADCI mentioned ~~our~~ mid-October letter requesting support for Central America. Weinberger mentioned that Defense is looking at three different ways to solve the problem. They will take care of us one way or another.

--

25X1

- MX/Dense Pack. The ADCI asked if there was anything the Intelligence Community could do to support the MX basing scheme. He added that the Intelligence Community could not get out of briefing Congress. SecDef mentioned that he was not concerned. He asks that the CIA address how soon the Soviets can respond to Dense Pack and with what. (The ADCI wants to forward to Weinberger a copy of our analysis before the upcoming NSC meeting). Weinberger added that they plan to design the MX deployment with BMD in mind but will not initiate at this point the BMD program. He also asks our input on how we can best present the case to Congress. The ADCI asked if the construction of the silos for Dense Pack would not be a violation of SALT. Weinberger responded that Defense lawyers believe that these can be considered capsules not silos, and that they will be somewhat mobile. He mentioned that Townes wonders about the actual hardness of Dense Pack because it has never been done.

--

25X1

- INF Deployment. The ADCI mentioned that the SPD in Germany may press for a delay in deployment and that the Laborites in Norway are threatening to hold up the Defense budget if INF is supported. Weinberger is confident that INF deployment will go ahead on schedule.
- Shemya Radar. Weinberger asked where it is. The ADCI responded but declined to go into the budgetary aspects which he prefers to do with Carlucci alone.

25X1

SECRET

25X1

10 November 1982

~~FOR~~ Acting Director of Central Intelligence  
SA/DCI/IA

SUBJECT : Meeting with Secretary Weinberger, 12 November 1982

1. I understand that both Weinberger and Carlucci will be in attendance this week. I got very little feedback on last week's meeting, so I was unable to produce a Memo for the Record. I know that Fred Ikle attended along with Carlucci, and briefed the Director on his recent trip to Latin America.

2. The following items are on your agenda:

- Weinberger Trip to Far East. Weinberger will brief you on the results of his recent swing through the Far East. *(Included some cables for your background.)*
- Pakistan.
- Redeye Missiles. In response to the note which you left with Carlucci two weeks ago, he commented last week that Defense was not yet ready to assess the impact of the sale of 300 additional missiles. They are planning, however, to inform you of their response this week, including the possibility of substituting the newer but more expensive Stinger missiles.
- F-16 Radars. You may wish to mention orally to Carlucci the essence of your written response regarding the risk assessment done by DDI on the transfer of the ALR-69 radars to Pakistan.
- Estimate. Finally, you may wish to mention the fact that the NFIB approved the new estimate on Pakistan and that we received a [redacted]

25X1

25X1

am sure that the Director had in hand the results of [redacted] last week, so you may wish to advise Weinberger on the status of our intelligence assessment on Pakistan's nuclear program. *(See Clark's memo just in requesting a joint policy review - Tab E)*

25X1

CL BY Signer  
DECL OADR

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

- FY 84 Budget. Last week the Director discussed this a bit with Carlucci, as you know. You may wish to inform Carlucci of any additional information resulting from yesterday's NFIC meeting. In addition, I just learned from [redacted] of the IC Staff that Carlucci plans to initiate a dialogue on who should pay the bill for the Reconnaissance Satellite Survivability Program. IC Staff is sending over a position paper for your use.
- MX/Dense Pack. As I mentioned to you this morning, Weinberger reportedly met with the President yesterday and may have officially made his recommendation to the President for MX deployment. You may wish to ask how he came out, particularly regarding BMD deployment. Included for your reference is a copy of the OSWR analysis of how long it would take the Soviets to react to and counter Dense Pack. In anticipation of the NSC meeting next week, [redacted] and OSWR are expanding their analysis to include a description of how the community analysis differs from that of the Townes Panel and others. [redacted] informed me that Sandia and Lawrence Livermore have, in fact, adjusted their assessments so that they are now closer to our own. He reports they previously had failed to factor into their time lines decision-making and deployment. They had really only focussed on the laboratory development time. A copy of the Townes Report is attached in a separate folder if you care to skim it. (FYI: If Defense, in fact, proposes BMD in conjunction with Dense Pack in order to insure survivability, we are talking about an expensive program. Dense Pack buys us maybe five to seven years of survivability but the BMD seems to make the critical difference because of the uncertainty introduced into the attacker's prospects for success. It would seem to me more cost effective and only slightly less survivable to deploy MX in current Minuteman silos protected by

Defense 25X1  
hold this  
till 19 Nov  
mtg - not yet  
ready.  
Kid

25X1

25X1

SECRET

SECRET

BMD. This would save the cost of the Dense Pack construction, and would be more palatable as far as SALT restrictions against the construction of new silos. It seems clear that land based silos are almost obsolete as a viable deployment scheme, and we should cut our losses as far as any major future capital outlays.)


- Cuba Policy Review. For Weinberger's benefit, you may wish to share some of your thoughts on this exercise in light of the inputs from [redacted] and Dewey.

25X1

3. I have included a couple of additional items that are somewhat interesting and if time permits you may wish to mention them:

- Soviet-Iranian Relations. Given Weinberger's strong feelings of anathema towards the Iranian regime, you may wish to call his attention to [redacted] perceptions that Soviet-Iranian relations seem to be deteriorating. *added*
- Afghanistan. The NID feature the other day suggests that the stalemate in the fighting will continue, and the recent reports of Soviet and Afghan deaths in the Salang Tunnel are noteworthy.

25X1



25X1

SECRET